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ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIGt
oTH the patient and those entrusted with his care are poorly served
by present rules and institutions relating to liability for medical
malpractice. This is generally known and said. On the one hand,
the physician, the nurse, the anesthetist, the hospital administrator and
others who, in the chain process of modern medicine, in easy retrospect,
appear to have committed an error of judgment or technique to the
patient's detriment, may be exposed to years of emotional and financial
stress or even to economic and professional disaster. Called upon to
alleviate such exposure, liability insurers seeking to distribute incalcu-
lable risks, find themselves compelled to charge more or less arbitrary
premiums which result in a disproportionate burden on the insured
and ultimately on the public. On the other hand, the patient who seeks
indemnity for an injury that he suffered somewhere in the chain process
of modem medicine, sees himself compelled to assert and to prove un-
provable fault. The complexity and uncertainty of the resulting litigation
must cause disproportionate expense. Moreover, there is the ever growing
clamor of plaintiffs' attorneys who chide the medical profession for dis-
couraging its members from assisting plaintiffs in a "conspiracy of
silence."1 Finally, even the patient who has been successful in obtaining
a judgment may remain without compensation where the defendant is
insolvent and fails to carry liability insurance.
Many of these problems are common to other kinds of enterprise
liability and have begun to occupy legislators and scholars particularly
in that area which most obviously and dramatically requires reform,
the law of automobile liability. I have tried elsewhere to show that the
ultimate solution in that area calls for replacing our present system of
tort liability and tort insurance by a compulsory accident insurance
t Walter Perry Johnson Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
1 See, e.g., Belli, Ready for the Plaintiff, 30 TEMNp. L.Q. 408 (1957). For a more bal-
anced view and additional references, see Polsky, The Malpractice Dilemma: A Cure
for Frustration, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 359 (1957). See also Caswell, A Surgeon's Thoughts on
Malpractice, 30 TEmp. L.Q. 391 (1957).
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for third party benefit.2 Though fundamental reforms of this kind will
probably be late in coming because of the lack of organized groups of pro-
ponents (pedestrian victims of the motorist), the powerful organizations
of physicians and hospitals which now suffer the impact of a similar
obsolete and in many respects vicious law, should be able to bring about
sooner the needed change and thus to create the model for analogous
solutions in other fields.
The enterprise character of modern medicine is most dearly decisive
for indemnity claims based on the vicarious liability of hospitals. Here,
in contrast to claims against the alleged individual injurer himself, the
law's primary concern is the equitable distribution of losses unavoidably
caused by mass operations and is undisturbed by the inclination of the
judge and jury to protect the defendant's professional standing.3 It is for
this reason that the attempt will be made in the present study to approach
the general problem of "malpractice" liability and insurance within the
limited area of the vicarious liability of hospitals.
The first reported cases which held hospitals liable for injuries caused
to their patients were related to private institutions and were decided
at the turn of the nineteenth century when such institutions began to
play a significant role.4 Until then most if not all hospitals had been
operated by either charities or governmental agencies which were pro-
tected against all liability by the then generally prevailing doctrines
of governmental and charitable immunity.5 But the new development
2 EHRENZWEIG, "FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VIcrIm (1954). On the basis
of my proposal, a similar plan has been developed to replace the present chaos of
products liability. Feldman, Liability of Manufacturers of Home Furnishings for Harm
Done by the Product, 1955 INS. L.J. 519. See also for air accidents, Sand, Limitation of
Liability and Passengers' Accident Compensation under the Warsaw Convention, 11
Aar. J. CoMP. L. 21, 43-51 (1962).
3 See Fleming, Developments in the English Law of Medical Liability, 12 VAND. L.
RzV. 633, 634 (1959). Other typical situations involving vicarious liability concern medi-
cal partnerships, joint enterprises and other arrangements involving multiple physi-
cians. See, e.g., Gerhardt v. Fresno Medical Group, 217 Cal. App. 2d 394, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1963). For further instances and in general, see LOuISELL & WILLIAmS, TRIAL
OF MALPRACTICE CASES §§ 16.01-.08 (1960) [hereinafter cited as LOUISELL & WILLIAMs].
4 See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365 (8th Cir. 1894) (contract theory,
see LOUISELL &c WILLIAMS § 18.14); Brown v. Socit Frangaise de Bienfaisance Mutu-
elle, 138 Cal. 475, 71 Pac. 516 (1903); Hogan v. Clarksburg Hosp. Co., 63 W. Va. 84, 59
S.E. 943 (1907); Drefahl v. Connell, 85 Wis. 109, 55 N.W. 160 (1893); see generally, 30
C.J. 465 (1923).
5 See Callender, Torts of Hospitals, 15 Amr. L. REv. 640 (1881); 13 R.C.L. Hospitals
§ 13 (1916); and generally HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, ATroR'NEY's VOLUME, Negligence 1I,
111 (1959); LOUISELL & WILLIAMS §§ 17.01-.57; Holdridge, Tort Liability of Hospitals,
8 CLEv.-MAR. L. Rzv. 394, 407-15 (1959); Levin, Malpractice and the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 1963 INS. L.J. 453; Lipson, Charitable Immunity: The Plague of Modern
Tort Concepts, 7 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 483 (1958). See also Sandor, The History of
Professional Liability Suits in the United States, 163 A.M.A.J. 459 (1957). On the
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was from its beginning affected by what may be called the original sin of
our law of enterprise liability. Here, as in other fields, a rapidly growing
new industry lacked an appropriate legal vehicle for the distribution
of the losses caused by its hazardous mass operations. The law of neg-
ligence was and has since been used and abused to fill a gap that had
been created too suddenly to permit legislative action.
Elsewhere I have tried to show how this original sin of enterprise
liability has led to an over-broadening of traditional tort concepts in a
new law of "negligence without fault,"0 and how liability insurance,
though threatening the purpose of tort liability as an admonitory device
for the promotion of care, and though poorly adapted for its new function
as a device for the distribution of unavoidable losses, has come to be
used to make the new non-fault liability bearable for the entrepreneur.
These observations are not only fully applicable to the liability and
liability insurance of private hospitals but, in view of the progressing
breakdown of the immunity doctrine,7 to an increasing extent to
governmental and charitable hospitals as well. Here, as in the law of
enterprise liability in general, current practice gives the claimant both
too little and too much, and thus fails both him and the entrepreneur.
Too LrrrLE AND Too MucH
To impose vicarious liability on a hospital for the negligence of its
employees without regard to any fault of its own in their selection or
supervision can, like most other types of vicarious liability, be justified
by the law's concern for the "victim's" protection. But once the hospital's
non-fault liability is thus justified as a means to avoid discrimination
between patients negligently injured by well-to-do and by judgment-
proof employees, there is no conceivable reason why such liability should
not also be imposed to avoid discrimination between those patients
injured accidentally and those injured by an employee's negligence. In
fact, courts and juries have found many ways to eliminate or mitigate
this discrimination. Most important in this respect is perhaps the broad
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquiturs which has been used to
history of hospitals in general, see RISLEY, HOUSE OF HEALING: THE STORY OF THE
HOSPITAL (1961).
0 See EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951).
7 See, e.g., Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961). For
a collection of authorities, see HOSPITAL LAw MANUAL, ATTORNEY'S VOLUME (1959);
LOUISELL & Wmi..AmS § 16.07. The non-legal literature is enormous. See headings on
Liability and Insurance in Hospital Literature Index. Only the most recent publica-
tions have been referred to in this paper.
8 See LONG, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE LAW 23-28 (1959); LOUISELL & WILLIAMS
§§ 14.01-15.08; Holdridge, supra note 5, at 403. That the physician's "negligence" liabil-
ity is typically not considered one for true fault appears, for instance, in the fact that
1964]
282 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:279
relieve the patient not only of his duty to prove "negligence" but even
of his duty to identify a "negligent" employee.9 But by thus correcting
the too little of our tort laws, courts have given too much, to the detri-
ment of the community of risk, by imposing, without regard to fault,
an unlimited liability which can be justified only as a means for the
atonement of wrongs.
The courts have reacted in a similar manner to the remaining dis-
crimination between those injured by one "employed" by the hospital,
and those injured by one otherwise a part of the hospital organization.' 0
Hospital liability from its inception has been severely limited by the
tests generally applicable to vicarious liability. Thus this liability has
been frequently denied for injuries inflicted by physicians and their
own employees, either because such physicians have been treated as in-
dependent contractors," or because their "professional" services have
been considered beyond the control of the hospital employer. This limi-
tation of the hospital's liability has even been extended to hospital
employees lent to the physician and to personnel paid by the patient
himself.12 But again, having given too little so long, courts now tend
to go to the other extreme. To an increasing extent they have treated
the hospital and its operations as a unitary enterprise's all of whose
hazards are most effectively distributed through the hospital's liability
and liability insurance. Thus the distinction between administrative and
professional services is about to be wholly abandoned; 14 hospital employ-
ees "lent" to the physician are treated as employees of both the hospital15
this so-called negligence is not treated as an intervening cause in dealing with claims
against the primary injurer. See PROSSER, TORTS 273 (2d ed. 1955).
9 Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); Frost v. Des Moines Still
College of Osteopathy and Surgery, 248 Iowa 294, 79 N.W.2d 306 (1956); LOUISELL &
WILLIAMS § 14.07; Fleming, supra note 8, at 646-48.
10 See generally FLEMING, TORTS 328-30 (2d ed. 1961); Fleming, supra note 3, at 637.
11 See, e.g., Moon v. Mercy Hosp., 878 P.2d 944 (Colo. 1962). See generally Annot.,
69 A.L.R.2d 805 (1960).
12 See, e.g., Ware v. Culp, 24 Cal. App. 2d 22, 74 P.2d 288 (1987) (nurse); Minogue
v. Rutland Hosp., 119 Vt. 886, 125 A.2d 796 (1956) (nurse).
1 See note 9 supra, and generally LOUISELL & WILLIAMS § 16.07; Fleming, supra note
8, at 687-38; Miller, Malpractice Used as a Hospital Defense, 10 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv.
1 (1961). For the parallel development in France where the hospital's only defense is
causation by foreign cause, see 1 MAZEAUD & TUNG, RESPONSAILrri CIVILE § 159-2 (5th
ed. 1957); Crdpeau, La Responsabilit6 civile des M~decins et de 'I.tablissement hospi-
talier (diss. Paris 1955).
14 Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 148 N.E.2d 3 (1957). See generally HosPrrAL LAW
MANUAL, ATroRNEY's VOLUME, Negligence I §§ 1-5 (1959); KRAMER, MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTIcE 17-22 (1962); Holdridge, supra note 5, at 404-07; Miller, supra note 18.
15 See Dickerson v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 211 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1954). See gen-
erally HosPrrAL LAW MANUAL, ATroRNEY's VOLUME, Negligence I § 3-1 (1959); LOUSSELL
& WILLIAMS § 16.05.
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and that physician and even concessionaires have been held to be em-
ployees of the hospital for the purpose of holding it liable.16
The resulting unlimited liability of hospitals for nearly all mishaps
occurring in their operation would have proved intolerable, both eco-
nomically and psychologically, had it not been for the availability of
liability insurance.' 7 But that institution, while relieving the most severe
symptoms of the disease, has, for the following reasons, failed to cure it.
1. There remains the great burden on time, energy and peace of mind
that is imposed on potential defendants by the continuous threat of
strike suits by claim-prone patients and by the possibility of jury verdicts
in excess of available or economically feasible insurance coverage. In
the face of these threats both physicians and hospitals are likely to
become increasingly wary of fruitful experimentation and hazardous
treatments.
2. The present possibility of suits against several persons for the same
incident compel each of such persons (including the hospital, the nurse' 8
and the physician) to carry his own liability insurance and thus to in-
crease the over-all premium load to the disadvantage of the public as the
ultimate consumer.
3. The wastefulness of multiple liabilities and premiums also appears
in the redistribution by subrogation claims among liability insurers, of
losses already distributed.
4. Since liability insurance is not compulsory, even the most valid
claim may remain unsatisfied if the defendant is insolvent.
5. Since liability coverage usually excludes liability for criminal acts
and acts performed in the state of intoxication or under the influence
of drugs, and since the policy will usually contain conditions concerning
I6 E.g., Carroll v. Richardson, 201 Va. 157, 110 S.E.2d 193 (1959) (defendant pathol-
ogist had contract to perform all laboratory and pathological services for lessor hos-
pital). On the hospital's liability for acts of its auxiliaries, see HOSPITAL LAW -MANUAL,
ArroRNY's VOLUME, Hospital Auxiliaries § 3-2 (1959).
17 Significantly, the judicial abolition of the immunity doctrine induced at least one
legislature temporarily to restore that immunity for amounts exceeding $10,000 so as
to enable the hospitals to protect themselves by liability insurance. N.J. STAT. ANN.
tit. 2A, §§ 53A-7, 8 (1962). See Anasiewicz v. Sacred Heart Church, 74 N.J. Super. 532,
181 A.2d 787, cert. denied, 38 N.J. 305, 184 A.2d 419 (1962); Johnston, Limited Liability
for Hospitals, Hosp. Mgt., Jan. 1959, p. 28. The New Jersey solution has been acclaimed
as a "fair compromise." Southwick, Current Legal Trends in Hospital Liability, Hospi-
tals, Feb. 1962, pp. 42, 120. See also LOUiSELL & WLLiAMs § 20.01; Hirsh, Insuring Against
Medical Professional Liability, 12 VAND. L. Rzv. 667 (1959). Pre-treatment releases from
liability obviously do not offer the needed relief. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of the
University of California, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441 (1963), invalidating such a
release as a matter of law.
18 See Note, Malpractice Liability Policy Needed by Practical Nurses, 8 PRAc. Nuas.
6 (1958).
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settlement and cooperation,19 the patient may remain uncompensated
even if the defendant carries insurance.
6. Finally, and perhaps most important, in many cases such recovery
as is ultimately obtained by the patient, must be paid for with the strain
and expense of protracted litigation.
THE PROPOSED SCHEME
A new scheme must be designed to indemnify the patient for losses
caused by the hazards of modern mass enterprise without requiring him
to find and to prove a real or fictitious fault, without forcing him into
litigation with its attendant delay, expense and perjury, and without
imposing on him the risk of the collectibility of his claim. Such a scheme
must at the same time protect the hospital against unlimited liability
for losses unavoidably caused in its mass operation, and must protect
the hospital's employees and contractors against the paralyzing risk of
ruinous demands. Finally, such a scheme must spare both the patient
and the hospital the disproportionate and idle expense of multiple
liability insurance and the confusion of a tort law that was never de-
signed for and is therefore unable to effect the equitable distribution of
unavoidable risk. If all this is to be achieved, tort law, the villain of the
piece, must go, and so must tort insurance, its accomplice. Both must
be replaced by a system of compulsory "accident" insurance for the
patient's benefit. While the settlement of many details would require a
careful factual and functional inquiry, the outline of such a system
can now be developed.
1. Every hospital, as a condition of its license to operate, would have
to carry minimum "hospital-accident insurance" for the benefit of its
patients. Additional coverage of the same type would be made available
to every patient on an optional basis.
2. This insurance would enable the patient injured by a "hospital-
accident," i.e., a failure in the process of his treatment relating to services
which were rendered or should have been rendered,2 0 or, in case of death,
19 See Hirsh, supra note 17, at 669. For suggested limitations of this exclusion, see
id. at 677. See also LouisFLL & WILLIAMS § 20.04; Note, Coverage and Exclusions of
Professional Liability Insurance, 170 A.M.A.J. 813 (1959).
20 The term "hospital-accident" as here proposed is, of course, not in accord with
current definitions of "accident." "Hospital-health" insurance, in a terminology
following the progressing replacement of the term "accident" in general "health
insurance," would have been preferable but would have been ambiguous as possibly
referring to hospital insurance as now written. But the new "hospital-accident" in-
surance could well be written so as also to cover all accidents in the accepted sense of
the word. It has been estimated that such accidents happen to 3.46% of all patients.
Stone, What Is a Reasonable "Standard Rate" for Patient Accidents?, Hospitals, Oct.
1962, p. 43. The following discussion follows my outline of an automobile insurance
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that patient's representative, to claim the benefits of the policy with-
out having to identify any specific injurer or a causative "negligence,"
and without having to take into account the benefits derived from other
(life, health, hospital or social) insurance other than those covering cash
expenses.
8. Such "hospital-accident insurance" would be written largely on
the model of existing accident or health insurance policies.
4. Any patient unable to recover on such a policy for his "hospital-
accident," e.g., because of the hospital's failure to keep its coverage in
force, would be entitled to an equivalent indemnity from an Uncom-
pensated-Injury Fund to be organized and operated by all hospital
accident insurers of the state.
5. Any hospital carrying the prescribed minimum coverage, as well
as all its employees and independent contractors, would be relieved of
their common-law liability for ordinary (in contrast to criminal) negli-
gence, and of all vicarious liability.
6. Liability for harm caused intentionally or by criminal negligence
could, upon the patient's request or ex officio, only be claimed from the
defendant by the Uncompensated-Injury Fund which would divide the
proceeds between itself and the patient in a manner to be prescribed
by statute. Being intended as a mere supplement to the patient's mini-
mum protection, such recoveries would, as "tort fines," in keeping with
their primarily punitive character, be measured by the gravity of the
offense and the defendant's financial circumstances. No insurance would
be available against such liability for criminal negligence.
7. If recovery for an intentional tort or criminal negligence should
fail because of the defendant's absence or insolvency, the patient would
obtain a statutory amount from the Uncompensated-Injury Fund.
How IT WOULD OPERATE
The proposed scheme, if implemented as suggested below, would offer
many advantages over the scheme of tort liability and tort insurance
now in effect.
1. Assurance and Easy Determination of Equal Minimum Awards
The patient would be assured a minimum recovery for any injury
to his health that he might sustain for reasons other than those induced
by his illness, during his stay at the hospital. Such recovery would be
equally assured in cases of criminal acts or other cases coverage of which
is excluded from current malpractice insurance policies.
scheme in EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 32-38. See also Ehrenzweig, Towards an
Automobile Compensation Plan, 11 FED. INS. COUNS. Q. 5 (1961).
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Accident insurance policies (whose pattern has remained substantially
unchanged through the last century)21 could furnish appropriate models
in determining an optimum schedule of benefits. In that determination
experiences gathered in workmen's compensation (with particular regard
to the General Employees' Compensation Act,2 2 the benefits of which are
generally recognized as adequate) would prove equally useful. The
indemnity would be based on a fixed tariff as in accident insurance,
rather than on actual earnings or earning power as in many systems of
workmen's compensation. This tariff would be based on the minimum
needs of low-income groups since it is these groups that offer the most
urgent social problem. Moreover, low awards would reduce abuse and
expense. As everybody is able to assess his own risk, if he considers his
own "worth" in excess of the statutory award, he will be free, and indeed
encouraged by hospital and physician, to take additional "hospital-
accident insurance." The proposed scheme, which would fix the potential
recovery, would thus be fairer to the well-to-do patient than the present
system under which the uncertainties of recovery inherent in tort liability
and tort insurance make planning of protection impossible.
On the other hand, awards must be high enough so as not to force juries
to find criminal negligence merely for the sake of being able to give
adequate compensation, as they have done almost consistently where
the statutory award is too low, e.g., under the Warsaw Convention con-
cerning air accidents.23
The basic unit of indemnity should, as in most accident24 and work-
men's compensation insurance policies, be the weekly indemnity. In order
to avoid amounts either so high as to produce moral hazard and pro-
hibitive premiums, or so low as to fall short of minimum needs, a weekly
indemnity of fifty dollars would seem appropriate at this time.25 But a
proviso might be added that certain sizable cost-of-living index fluctua-
tions would automatically increase or decrease this amount as well as the
corresponding premium.
21 FAULKNER, HEALTH INSURANCE 512-33 (1960). See also MOWBRAY & BLANCHARD, IN-
SURANCE 282-87 (5th ed. 1961).
22 5 U.S.C. § 751 (1958).
23 See EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 27. See generally Sand, supra note 2.
24 The relation, for "level insurance," between the principal sum ($1,000 for death)
and the weekly indemnity ($5) has remained the same since 1864. See FAULKNER, op. cit.
supra note 21, at 517.
25 The minimum rate payable to federal employees, with certain exceptions, is
$112.50 per month. 63 Stat. 858 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 756(c) (1958). For an alternative benefit
structure, see, e.g., Riesenfeld, Efficacy and Costs of Workmen's Compensation, 49 CALIF.
L. REv. 631 (1961) (brought up to date in OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY AND PUBLIC POLICY
279, 311 (Cheit & Gordon ed. 1963)). For possible social security analogues, see Pollack,
Disability Insurance Under Social Security, in OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY AND PUBLIC
PoLIcY, op. cit. supra at 158, 177-82.
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On the weekly unit basis specific benefits would be computed as
follows:
In the event of death, the lump-sum payment of 200 weekly indemnities
usually provided in an accident policy would fail to offer a minimum
subsistence to the bereaved family. Therefore, a percentage-perhaps
forty-five per cent-of the weekly indemnity should be the basic
claim, until death or remarriage, of widows or widowers primarily
dependent on the deceased. An additional fifteen per cent should be
provided for each child until death or majority, with the limitation that
the total claim on behalf of the deceased's family may not exceed seventy-
five per cent of the basic indemnity.2 6 A lump sum of 500 dollars could
be provided for funeral expenses.2 7 To accelerate and simplify adjust-
ment, recipients might be given the option of requesting a lump-sum
payment of 10,000 dollars or an amount computed on the basis of exist-
ing mortality tables. Unlawful continuation of receipt should be dis-
couraged by punishment.2 8
Total permanent disability would entitle the patient to the basic
weekly indemnity for life.2 Here, as in the case of death, both the in-
surer and the recipient might be given an option to request a lump-sum
payment, either fixed in the policy or computed on the basis of mortality
rates. Loss, or loss of use, of both hands, arms, feet, legs or eyes should
be considered prima facie evidence of total permanent disability,3 0 and,
in contrast to most workmen's compensation schemes and ordinary ac-
cident insurance, objective standards should be given general prefer-
ence.3 1
Partial disability, temporary or permanent, and temporary total dis-
ability would of course raise questions in the ascertainment of fractional
or temporary claims-concededly more so than in present-day liability
or accident insurance with its usual maximum benefit periods of from
three to four months.32 These difficulties will have to be faced, however,
if the social purpose of the proposed plan is to be safeguarded. They
are, after all, being faced in workmen's compensation today.3 3 Arbitration
2 39 Stat. 744 (1916), 5 U.S.C. § 760 (1958).
27 39 Stat. 745 (1916), 5 U.S.C. § 761 (1958).
28 89 Stat. 744 (1916), 5 U.S.C. § 760(L) (1958).
29 See FAULKNER, op. cit. supra note 21, at 101.
30 63 Stat. 855 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 753 (1958).
31 Concerning the "any occupation" in contrast to the "his occupation" test see
FAULKNER, op. cit. supra note 21, at 102; Riesenfeld, Basic Problems in the Adminis-
tration of Workmen's Compensation, 36 MINN. L. REv. 119, 124 (1952).
32 See, e.g., FAULKNER, op. cit. supra note 21, at 111; MACINTYRE, VOLUNTARY HEALTH
INSURANCE AND RATE MAKING 54-64 (1962).
33 See generally, Riesenfeld, supra note 31, at 122, 134.
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agreements in the policy34 may expedite investigation and decision. A
great deal might be gained by giving both the insurer and the insured,
or merely the latter, the option of lump-sum payment for certain typical
injuries. Compensation could be fixed in terms of the weekly indemnity
or in terms of flat amounts on the model of accident insurance35 or the
Federal Employees' Compensation Act.3 6 In addition, surgical or attend-
ant's care and hospitalization would be compensable in fixed percent-
ages of the basic weekly rate,37 while modern rehabilitation provisions
might help in facilitating adjustment38 A considerable reduction of
premiums, which has been estimated at twenty per cent, could be
achieved by providing for a waiting period of seven days, which is said
to eliminate thirty-two per cent of accident claims;39 and in contrast to
the prevailing practice in accident insurance, by taking into account
payments received from other sources (such as independent health or
hospital insurance) for cash expenses (such as surgery) though not for
loss of income 40 or unmeasurable harm.
2. Elimination of Threat, Gamble, Stigma and Expense of Litigation
The greatest advantage of the proposed scheme would be that it would
not only relieve the patient of the economic and emotional strain of
protracted litigation requiring difficult or impossible proof, but would
also relieve the defendant (hospital, nursing home,41 nurse, officers, and
34 For early practices to this effect in workmen's compensation, see id. at 130. In
fire insurance such agreements are the rule.
35 See, e.g., RIEGEL & MILLER, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 264 (1947): 200
weeks for one hand and one foot, hand or foot and one eye; 100 weeks for either hand
or foot; 65 weeks for one eye; 50 weeks for thumb and index finger. See also FAULKNER,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 106, for similar schedules.
36 63 Stat. 855 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 755(a) (1958): 205 weeks for one foot; 244 weeks for
one hand; 160 weeks for one eye. As to workmen's compensation in general, see
Riesenfeld, supra note 31, at 125. In contrast to awards in that field, hospital compensa-
tion, being based on minimum needs rather than earning power, will have to stress
objective standards and leave to excess accident insurance, see text at note 22 supra,
the alleviation of any individual hardship caused by this computation.
37 See 63 Stat. 858 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 756(b)(1) (1958).
38 See 63 Stat. 858 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 756(d) (1958); Gulledge, Vocational Rehabilita-
tion of Industrially Injured Workers, in OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY AND PoLIC POLICY,
op. cit. supra note 25, at 395; Riesenfeld, supra note 31, at 120; Somers and Somers,
Rehabilitation and Workmen's Compensation, 1954 INS. L.J. 71.
39 The American Accident Table indicates that almost one-half of all industrial
accidents cause disability lasting one week or less. See REEDE, ADEQUACY OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION 30 (1947). In 63 Stat. 854 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 752 (1958), compensation is
denied to federal employees for the first three days, unless the disability exceeds
twenty-one days or is followed by permanent disability. See also FAULKNER, op. cit.
supra note 21, at 110-11.
40 As in accident insurance, continued receipt of wages should probably not be
taken into account. Experience has failed to show any increase of the moral hazard.
41 See Note, Mod. Hosp., April, 1962, p. 16.
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above all, the physician) of a continuous threat crippling both sound
experimentation and courageous treatment.42
Moreover, the proposed scheme would eliminate the element of a
gamble inherent in any personal injury suit which may now deter many
from prosecuting just claims. Also, courts and parties would cease en-
gaging in the game of hide-and-seek43 now disgracing both the institu-
tion of insurance and court procedure: The insurer, instead of secretively
carrying the burden and claiming the guidance of the proceedings, would
take his proper place as the protector of both the public and its medical
facilities. "Direct actions" against the insurer,4 4 now permissible in only
a few states, would become a matter of course.
Under the present law the patient must prove not only causation of his
injury but also the blameworthy character of such causation. The pro-
posed scheme would reduce this burden to a duty to prove causation.
To be sure, even that duty is not easily defined. Some such formula as
that now often used in malpractice insurance policies, namely the refer-
ence to "services rendered or which should have been rendered,"45 would
have to be retained despite its frequent ambiguity. But both the plaintiff
and the defendant would be relieved of the burden and stigma of hav-
ing to prove or disprove an act or omission of "malpractice."
Finally, although a definitive conclusion could be reached only after
a thorough actuarial study,46 the premium cost of the proposed scheme
would presumably be considerably smaller than that of the existing
system of liability insurance. There would be avoided the need for multi-
ple insurance now carried by the hospital, its employees and independ-
ent contractors, all of whom are now potentially liable for the same
event. Wasteful subrogation suits, which would be limited to cases in-
volving criminal acts, would become rare. Moreover, the dramatic re-
duction of litigation with its concomitant cost and fees would eliminate
a burdensome element of the total expense. And, most important, the
benefits accruing under the policy would be limited and definite in
42 See LouisELL & WILLIAMs § 20.01; Morris, Medical Malpractice-A Changing Pic-
ture, 1956 INs. L.J. 319; Silverman, Medicine's Legal Nightmare, Sat. Eve. Post, April
11, p. 13; April 18, p. 31; April 25, p. 36 (1959). The threat to physicians and other in-
dividuals is particularly great where the hospital itself remains immune. See Regan,
Negligence Immunity, Hosp. Prog., July 1962, p. 27; Southwick, Current Legal Trends
in Hospital Liability, Hospitals, Feb. 16, 1962, pp. 42, 117.
43 LOUiSELL 9- WILLIAMS § 20.02 n.23.
44 Id. at § 20.02, especially pp. 587-88.
45 Id. at § 20.03. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
46 "[R]eported cases represent only a small fraction of suits filed and claims brought
against physicians .... It is unfortunate that complete statistical data is not available
from the insurance companies ...." Stetler, The History of Reported Medical Pro-
fessional Liability Cases, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 366, 383 (1957).
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amount, thus rendering unnecessary the calculation of widely vacillating
and often exorbitant jury assessments. 4 7
3. Promotion of Care and Safety; Additional Tort Recovery
The physician, now working under the continuous threat of personal
liability, would, it has been stressed before, be relieved of the concern
which seriously impairs the progress and effectiveness of medical practice.
This development would not, as might be suggested, reduce the prevail-
ing standard of care, but increase it. For, like current liability insurance,
the proposed scheme would not protect the physician against liability
incurred by criminal negligence. And, unlike the present system, the
proposed scheme would not only deprive the offender of his insurance
protection, but it would assure proper civil sanctions in cases of such
negligence by providing for ex officio recovery on the patient's behalf
by the Uncompensated-Injury Fund. These sanctions would be fairer to
the defendant in that the scheme would stipulate the imposition of "tort
fines" to be measured by the gravity of the offense and the defendant's
financial circumstances rather than the purely accidental extent of harm.
To be sure, such a scheme, while promoting safety, would discriminate
between those injured by accident or ordinary negligence, who would
be limited to statutory recovery, and those injured by criminal negligence,
who would retain their tort claims. In a wholly rational world, that dis-
crimination could be avoided by leaving the admonition of the criminal
to the criminal law. But such a solution, while logically the only sound
one, would fail to respond to the victim's demand for revenge which,
though irrational, must be taken into account as being no less real than
rational needs.48 It is proposed, therefore, to maintain the civil action
and to reduce the resulting discrimination by having the Fund retain
a statutory percentage of the net recovery, which may vary from ten to
fifty per cent according to the amounts involved and possibly the gravity
of the crime. Failure of recovery because of the defendant's absence or
insolvency would be at least partly neutralized by a contribution from
the Uncompensated-Injury Fund.
CONCLUSION
Suits for "medical malpractice" have come to endanger the function-
ing of medical care and legal process. While producing intolerable
economic and emotional strain for all parties, they benefit no one. These
47 See Mettler and Brenner, Are Malpractice Premiums Being Set by Guesswork?,
36 MED. ECON. 241 (1959). On the rating problem generally, see MACINTYRE, op. cit.
supra note 32, at 32.
48 See generally, Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence, 47 Nw. U.L. R~v. 855
(1953); Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of the Insanity Plea, - YALE L.J. - (1964).
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two great professions, with the imaginative help of the insurance industry,
that must give us new answers. I have suggested that such Answers should
be sought in the replacement of tort liability and tort insurance by a new
structure based on insuring the loss where it occurs. I have tried to show
that we may thus achieve the assurance and easy determination of equal
minimum awards, the elimination of the threat, gamble, stigma and ex-
pense of litigation, and the promotion of care and safety. Only if the law
thus proves capable of responding to new needs, will it be able to save free
medical enterprise from the mounting pressures of a collective society.
